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THE SURVIVAL OF UNIVERSAL HEALTH
CARE IN MASSACHUSETTS: ERISA
PREEMPTION OF AN ACT PROVIDING
ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE, QUALITY,
ACCOUNTABLE HEALTH CARE
LUKE T. TASHJIAN*
INTRODUCTION
It is widely recognized that the health care system in the
United States is in crisis.1 The hallmarks of this crisis are a decrease
in the quality of care, an increase in the cost of care, and a decline
in access to care.2 A reduction in employer sponsored health care
coverage has been a root cause of the decline in access to care.3
* Luke T. Tashjian is an attorney practicing law in Worcester, Massachusetts. He
received his J.D. with honors from the University of Connecticut School of Law in 2006.
He is admitted to practice law in Massachusetts and Connecticut.
1. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 496 n.15 (D. Md.
2006), aff’d, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007). Despite the United States spending sixteen
percent of its gross domestic product on health care while other industrialized nations
spend ten percent or less, Brief for AARP as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 6,
Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n, 475 F.3d 180 (Nos. 06-1840 & 06-1901), the United States
consistently performs more poorly than most industrialized countries on many mea
sures of health care quality. NAT’L COAL. ON HEALTH CARE, HEALTH CARE FACTS:
QUALITY OF CARE (2009), http://nchc.org/sites/default/files/resources/Fact Sheet
Quality.pdf. “The U.S. is 33 percent worse than the best country on mortality from
conditions amendable to health care—that is, deaths that could have been prevented
with timely and effective care.” NAT’L COAL. ON HEALTH CARE, FACTS ON THE QUAL
ITY OF HEALTH CARE 1 (2008) (on file with Western New England Law Review) [here
inafter FACTS ON THE QUALITY OF HEALTHCARE]. “Medication-related errors for
hospitalized patients cost roughly $2 billion annually.” THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
THE CHASM IN QUALITY: SELECT INDICATORS FROM RECENT REPORTS 1 (2008), http://
www.chicagomdjd.com/CM/Articles/The-Chasm-in-Quality-Highlighted.pdf. “Medical
errors kill more people per year than breast cancer, AIDS, or motor vehicle accidents.”
Id. “The infant mortality rate in the U.S. is 7.0 deaths per 1,000 live births, compared
with 2.7 in the top three countries.” FACTS ON THE QUALITY OF HEALTHCARE, supra,
at 1.
2. Brief for AARP as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, supra note 1, at 3.
3. Id. at 6; David Pratt, The Past, Present and Future of Health Care Reform: Can
it Happen?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 767, 773-74 (2007); see NAT’L COAL. ON HEALTH
CARE, HEALTH CARE FACTS: COSTS (2009), http://nchc.org/sites/default/files/resources/
Fact%20Sheet%20-%20Cost.pdf.
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The role of this reduction is hard to overstate since most Americans
receive their coverage through an employer.4
Politicians and citizens alike have realized that action must be
taken to stem the decline in employer sponsored health care, but
there has been a historic inability at the federal level to employ
effective solutions.5 This inability has led to efforts by the States to
protect, encourage, and in some cases mandate employer sponsored
coverage.6 These state efforts have consistently come up against
and been struck down by a federal statute that, ironically, was in
tended to promote the provision of employee benefits, the Em
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 19747 (“ERISA”).
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts undertook one of the
most recent and sweeping state efforts to reverse the decline in ac
cess to health care. This effort is reflected in a bill passed by the
Massachusetts legislature and signed into law by Governor Romney
in 2006 (“the Bill”).8 The Bill sought to reverse the decline in ac
cess to care by mandating that individuals procure minimum credit
able coverage and that employers make a fair and reasonable
contribution toward this coverage.9 Due to these mandates, there
has been wide success in reducing the number of uninsured in
Massachusetts.10
Improved access to health care, however, may be short-lived.
Similar to earlier state-enacted legislation, the Bill is likely to face
an ERISA preemption challenge, and upon hearing this challenge,
a court will likely hold that a key provision of the Bill, the employer
fair share contribution requirement, is preempted.
Without subjecting the Bill to ERISA preemption, the objec
tive of the employer fair share contribution requirement, namely
4. Elise Gould, The Erosion of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance 1 (The Ec
onomic Policy Institute, Briefing Paper No. 223, 2008), available at http://epi.3cdn.net/
d1b4356d96c21c91d1_ilm6b5dua.pdf.
5. David Simon, Fair Share at Health Care: Current ERISA Preemption Jurispru
dence Paves the Way for Health Care Reform, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 497, 499 (2007).
6. Id. at 500.
7. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1000-1461 (2006); Si
mon, supra note 5, at 501.
8. An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care,
ch. 58, 2006 Mass. Acts 77 (codified in scattered sections of MASS. GEN. LAWS (2008)),
available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaw06/sl060058.htm.
9. Steve LeBlanc, State Broadens Health Insurance Regs for Firms, WORCESTER
TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Oct. 2, 2008, at A4 (quoting Sarah Iselin, Commissioner of the
Massachusetts Division of Health Care Finance and Policy).
10. Glen Johnson, State Insurance Law Result Remarkable, WORCESTER TELE
GRAM & GAZETTE, Aug. 20, 2008, at A3.
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that employers be required to contribute to their employees’ cover
age,11 can still be accomplished if certain changes are made to the
Bill. These changes include repealing the fair share contribution
requirement, increasing the state minimum wage while structuring
it to resemble a prevailing wage with cash and benefit components,
restricting employee access to Commonwealth Care policies to em
ployees who finance their contributions towards these policies with
direct deposits from their paychecks, and strengthening the individ
ual mandate by providing that withholdings shall be taken from the
paychecks of individuals who fail to procure minimum creditable
coverage.
I. ERISA PREEMPTION
A. ERISA Preemption in General
In 1974, Congress enacted ERISA to encourage the adoption
of employee benefit plans and to protect the interests of plan par
ticipants. It was the belief of Congress that replacement of the dis
parate state laws governing employee benefit plans with the
substantive and uniform federal regulatory scheme12 contained in
ERISA would reduce the administrative burden placed on inter
state employers, and this reduced burden would, in turn, increase
the number of employers offering employee benefit plans.13 “To
this end, ERISA includes expansive pre-emption provisions, . . .
which are intended to ensure that employee benefit plan regulation
would be ‘exclusively a federal concern.’”14
One type of employee benefit plan that falls within the reach
of ERISA’s preemption provision is an employee welfare benefit
11. See State House News Service, Daily Transcript, May 4, 2006 (on file with
Western New England Law Review) (Senator Lees’s response to question regarding
overriding Governor Mitt Romney’s veto of section 47 of House Bill 4779).
12. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990). “Nothing in ER
ISA requires employers to establish employee benefit plans. Nor does ERISA mandate
what kind of benefits employers must provide if they choose to have such a plan.”
Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996).
13. See Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at 142.
14. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (quoting Alessi v. Ray
bestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981)); see also Anthony Ten Haagan, Sur
viving Preemption: The Importance of Chapter 58 in the Context of America’s Health
Care Crisis, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 663, 664 (2007); Wendy K. Mariner, State Regulation of
Managed Care and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 335 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1986, 1986 (1996).
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plan.15 An “employee welfare benefit plan” is defined broadly by
ERISA to include any
plan, fund, or program which was . . . established or maintained
by an employer or by an employee organization . . . for the pur
pose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries,
through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, . . . medical, sur
gical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sick
ness, accident, [or] disability.16

Within this definition of an employee welfare benefit plan, a
“plan” is “a set of rules that define the rights of a beneficiary and
provide for their enforcement.”17
While established definitions of “employee welfare benefit
plan” and “plan” exist, neither ERISA nor its legislative history de
fine the term “medical benefit,”18 and in the absence of statutory
guidance, courts have interpreted the term broadly.19 This broad
judicial interpretation of “medical benefit” results in the vast ma
jority of health care benefits that an employer extends to its em
ployees, including employer sponsored health insurance programs,
qualifying as employee welfare benefit plans.20
The actual preemption rule, which is subsection (a) of section
514 of ERISA, provides, “Except as provided in subsection (b) of
this section [the Savings Clause], the provisions of this subchapter
. . . shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .”21 The Sav
ings Clause states that, “Except as provided in subparagraph (B)
[the Deemer Clause], nothing in this subchapter shall be construed
to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(3), 1003(a), 1144(a) (2006). The other type of employee
benefit plan is an employee pension benefit plan. Id. § 1002(3).
16. Id. § 1002(1); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760, 763 (9th Cir.
1980), aff’d mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981).
17. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 223 (2000). “Rules governing collection of
premiums, definition of benefits, submission of claims, and resolution of disagreements
over entitlement to services are the sorts of provisions that constitute a plan.” Id.
18. Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Ahue, 12 F.3d 1498, 1502 (9th Cir. 1993).
19. See id. at 1503 (holding FAA-mandated medical examinations for pilots are
considered medical benefits).
20. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 190 (4th Cir. 2007);
Madonia v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., 11 F.3d 444, 447 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding
that a closely held corporation that subsidized health insurance policies for some of its
employees had established an ERISA employee welfare benefit plan); Brief for Cham
ber of Commerce of U.S.A. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee at 15, Retail Indus.
Leaders Ass’n, 475 F.3d 180 (No. 06-1840) (citing to 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
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regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”22 The Deemer Clause
restricts the application of the Savings Clause by providing,
Neither an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust established
under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company
or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or
to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for pur
poses of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance
companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or
investment.23

To summarize the mechanics of these three provisions, the Pre
emption Clause preempts state laws that relate to employee welfare
benefit plans, but it does not preempt state laws regulating insur
ance. However, states are prohibited from regulating employee
benefit plans through laws purporting to regulate insurance.24
B. Test for ERISA Preemption
With respect to ERISA’s preemption clause, the United States
Supreme Court has “observed repeatedly that this broadly worded
provision is clearly expansive.”25 The degree of expansiveness,
however, is dependent upon the meaning given to the innocuous
term “relate to” contained in the clause. As the Supreme Court has
stated, “the term ‘relate to’ cannot be taken ‘to extend to the fur
thest stretch of indeterminacy,’ or else ‘for all practical purposes
pre-emption would never run its course.’”26
In light of this limitation, the Supreme Court has developed a
two-part test to determine if a state law “relates to” an employee
benefit plan. Under this test, the Court examines if the challenged
law has either a “connection with” or “reference to” an ERISA
plan.27 In traditional areas of state regulation, such as health care,28
courts apply this test in conjunction with a presumption that Con
gress did not intend to preempt the state law.29
22. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
23. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
24. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987).
25. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 146 (2001) (internal quotation marks omit
ted) (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995)).
26. Id. at 146 (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655).
27. Id. at 147; Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990); Shaw
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
28. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371 (1976).
29. De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 813-14
(1997) (citing Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715
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A statute has “reference to” an ERISA plan when the “State’s
law acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans . . . or
where the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s opera
tion.”30 Under this inquiry, the Court has held preempted state
laws that imposed requirements by reference to ERISA-covered
programs,31 that specifically exempted ERISA plans from other
wise generally applicable garnishment provisions,32 and that estab
lished causes of action requiring the existence of ERISA plans.33
Even if a state law does not contain a prohibited “reference to”
an ERISA plan, the state law will still be preempted by section
514(a) if it has a “connection with” a covered plan.34 To determine
if a state law has a prohibited “connection with” a covered plan, a
court must examine whether it was Congress’s intent for ERISA to
preempt the type of challenged law by analyzing the nature of the
effect of the challenged state law on the uniform nationwide admin
istration of employee benefit plans.35 State laws with only a “tenu
ous, remote or peripheral” effect on ERISA plans will be upheld.36
In general, these “are typically ‘laws of general application—often
traditional exercises of state power or regulatory authority—whose
effect on ERISA plans is incidental.’”37 In contrast, state laws that

(1985)); Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 494 (D. Md. 2006)
(quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657), aff’d, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Egel
hoff, 532 U.S. at 148; Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987).
30. Rutledge v. Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, 201 F.3d 1212, 1216
(9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cal. Div. of Labor Stan
dards v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997)).
31. District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130-31
(1992).
32. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 828 n.2
(1988).
33. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 140 (1996) (preempting state
cause of action based on wrongful termination of employee when termination based on
vesting of ERISA plan benefits).
34. Id.; see Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983).
35. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001); Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. at
325-26; Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659.
36. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661 (quoting Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. at
130 n.1). The indirect effect of a surcharge on hospital expenses for those whose ex
penses were not paid by Blue Cross & Blue Shield did not bind plan administrators to
any particular choice and was not preempted. Id. at 664; see also Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100
n.21.
37. Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Ahue, 12 F.3d 1498, 1504 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146 (2d Cir. 1989)).
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mandate some element of the structure or administration of ERISA
plans will be preempted.38
In determining whether or not a state law is preempted under
the “connection with” test for effectively mandating some element
of the structure or administration of a covered plan, a court consid
ers four factors.39 The first factor examines “whether the state law
regulates the types of benefits provided by ERISA employee wel
fare benefit plans.”40 The second factor examines “whether the
state law requires the establishment of a separate employee benefit
plan to comply with the law.”41 The third factor examines “whether
the state law imposes reporting, disclosure, funding, or vesting re
quirements on ERISA plans.”42 The fourth factor examines
“whether the state law regulates certain ERISA relationships, in
cluding the relationships between an ERISA plan and an employer
and, to the extent an employee benefit plan is involved, between an
employer and employee.”43
II.

THE MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH CARE REFORM BILL

The Massachusetts Health Care Reform Bill44 constitutes the
second “pay-or-play” statute that was implemented by a state.45
38. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97; see also Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475
F.3d 180, 192-93 (4th Cir. 2007).
39. See Rutledge v. Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, 201 F.3d 1212,
1218 (9th Cir. 2000).
40. Operating Eng’rs Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. JWJ Contracting Co., 135
F.3d 671, 678 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Aloha Airlines, 12 F.3d at 1504); see also Shaw,
463 U.S. at 100 (preempting a state law requiring ERISA plans to pay benefits to indi
viduals unable to work due to pregnancy).
41. JWJ Contracting Co., 135 F.3d at 678 (quoting Aloha Airlines, 12 F.3d at
1504); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Cyne, 482 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1987) (holding that
one-time lump sum severance payment does not relate to an ERISA plan since the law
does not require the establishment or maintenance of a plan).
42. JWJ Contracting Co., 135 F.3d at 678 (quoting Aloha Airlines, 12 F.3d at
1504); see also Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760, 763 (9th Cir. 1980)
(holding a state cannot require an employer to provide certain employee welfare bene
fits through an ERISA plan), aff’d mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981).
43. JWJ Contracting Co., 135 F.3d at 678 (quoting Aloha Airlines, 12 F.3d at
1504).
44. An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care,
ch. 58, 2006 Mass. Acts 77, available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaw06/
sl060058.htm.
45. The first pay-or-play law was the Maryland Fair Share Act, MD. CODE ANN.,
LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-102 (LexisNexis 2008). This is not including the Hawaii Prepaid
Healthcare Act because the Hawaii Act was granted an exemption from preemption.
The Maryland Act was preempted by ERISA in Retail Industry Leaders Ass’n v.
Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007). See Brief for Chamber of Commerce of U.S.A. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee, supra note 20, at 3 (defining pay-or-play laws).
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While this may make it appear that such statutes requiring employ
ers either to contribute to their employees’ coverage or pay a state
surcharge are a new concept, the Massachusetts legislature strug
gled for almost two decades to implement a pay-or-play statute.
The initial effort to compel Massachusetts employers to con
tribute to their employees’ coverage resulted in the passage of an
act in 1988 titled, “An Act to Make Health Security Available to
All Citizens of the Commonwealth and to Improve Hospital Fund
ing” (“the 1988 Act”).46 The 1988 Act incorporated a form of a
pay-or-play statute by requiring businesses employing six or more
employees to pay a medical security contribution of up to twelve
percent of their employees’ wages into a state fund, but allowing a
credit against this contribution equal to the employer’s contribution
toward its employees’ health care coverage.47 Although this law
would have accomplished the Bill’s goal of requiring employers to
contribute to their employees’ coverage, the 1988 Act was amended
to remove the tax and tax credit features it contained before these
features were implemented.48
Similar to the 1988 Act, the Bill mandates that covered em
ployers make legislatively-determined fair and reasonable contribu
tions toward their employees’ coverage, but unlike the tax and tax
credit features of the 1988 Act, the Bill requires covered employers
to either make the contribution or pay a fixed surcharge. Also, in
contrast to the prior legislation, the Bill places a mandate on indi
viduals to obtain minimum creditable coverage.
A. The Individual Mandate
The individual mandate contained in the Bill required all re
sidents of the Commonwealth who are over eighteen years of age to
obtain minimum creditable coverage by July 1, 2007.49 To assist in
the procurement of this coverage, the Bill established both a sliding
scale under which the cost of premiums for commercial plans is sub
46. An Act to Make Health Security Available to All Citizens of the Common
wealth and to Improve Hospital Financing, ch. 23, 1988 Mass. Acts 85, available at
http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/actsResolves/1988/1988Acts0023.pdf.
47. § 46, 1988 Mass. Acts at 142-43.
48. An Act Providing for Improved Access to Health Care, ch. 203, § 21, 1996
Mass. Acts 913, 928-32, available at http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/actsResolves/1996/
1996acts0203.pdf; see Jared Stiefel, ERISA Preemption of Chapter 58: The Future of the
“Pay or Play” Model of Health Care Legislation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 683, 691-92
(2007).
49. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, §§ 1-2 (2008).
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sidized based on an individual’s income50 and the Commonwealth
Health Insurance Connector (“the Commonwealth Connector”).51
The Commonwealth Connector assists individuals in obtaining cov
erage by enabling them to purchase insurance through a larger risk
pool, analyzing the benefits provided by the plans it offers, and ne
gotiating with insurers for competitive rates.52
An individual’s coverage can either be deemed per se to consti
tute minimum creditable coverage53 or it can be determined to con
stitute minimum creditable coverage by complying with the
regulations promulgated by the Commonwealth Connector.54 As
of January 1, 2009, these regulations require the provision of a
broad range of care and a prescription drug benefit, restrict the im
position of deductibles to within established limits, restrict the im
position of in-network deductibles, and prohibit overall maximum
benefit and per-illness, annual maximum benefit caps for covered
core services.55
Unless one of two exceptions apply, a resident’s failure to ob
tain “minimum creditable coverage” will result in the individual’s
loss of his or her state personal income tax exemption as well as the
individual being charged for fifty percent of the cost of the least
expensive plan offered through the Commonwealth Connector.56
The first exception from the application of these penalties applies
to individuals who the Commonwealth Connector has determined
there is an absence of affordable coverage for.57 The second excep
tion exempts individuals who can establish that they did not obtain
minimum creditable coverage because of sincerely held religious
beliefs.58
B. Employer Mandates
The Bill imposes three mandates on covered employers, which
are employers that employ eleven or more full-time equivalent em
ployees in the Commonwealth.59 The first mandate requires cov
ered employers to make a “fair and reasonable premium
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. ch. 118H, §§ 1-5.
Id. ch. 176Q, § 2(a).
Id. §§ 1-4.
Id. ch. 111M, § 1.
Id.
956 MASS. CODE REGS. 5.03 (2008).
830 MASS. CODE REGS. 111M2.1(5)(c) (2008).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, § 2.
Id. § 3.
Id. ch. 118G, § 6C; id. ch. 149, § 188(b); id. ch. 151F, § 2.
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contribution” to their employees’ group health insurance.60 The
second mandate requires covered employers to establish cafeteria
plans under § 125 of the Internal Revenue Code that offer at least
one premium-only health benefit option.61 The third mandate re
quires covered employers to comply with statutory reporting
requirements.62
1. The Fair and Reasonable Contribution Requirement
All covered employers must make a “fair and reasonable pre
mium contribution” to their employees’ “group health plan” as de
fined in § 5000(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code.63 A covered
employer that employs fifty or fewer full-time equivalent employ
ees in the Commonwealth may make a “fair and reasonable pre
mium contribution” by either offering to pay thirty-three percent of
the premium of a group health plan offered by the employer or by
having twenty-five percent of its employees enrolled in its group
health plan.64 Beginning January 1, 2009, an employer who em
ploys more than fifty full-time equivalent employees in the Com
monwealth is only deemed to have made a “fair and reasonable
premium contribution” when either at least seventy-five percent of
its employees are enrolled in its group health plan or both of the
prior two tests are met; namely, no less than twenty-five percent of
its employees are enrolled in its plan and it offers to pay for thirtythree percent of the plan premium.65
Covered employers who fail to make a “fair and reasonable
premium contribution” toward a group health plan for their em
ployees are required to pay a surcharge to the Commonwealth Care
Trust Fund.66 The calculation of this surcharge reflects a portion of
the cost the Commonwealth incurs in providing state-funded care.
At the present time, the surcharge is at the statutory maximum of
60. Id. ch. 149, § 188.
61. Id. ch. 151F, § 2; 114.5 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.01 (2007).
62. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118G, § 6C.
63. Id. ch. 149, § 188(a). Within the meaning of § 5000(b) of the Internal Reve
nue Code, a group health plan is “a plan (including a self-insured plan) of, or contrib
uted to by, an employer . . . or employee organization to provide health care (directly or
otherwise) to the employees, former employees, the employer, others associated or for
merly associated with the employer in a business relationship, or their families.” 26
U.S.C. § 5000(b)(1) (2006).
64. 114.5 MASS. CODE REGS. 16.03 (2009).
65. Id.
66. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(d).
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$295 per year for each full-time employee,67 and the surcharge is
not expected to fall below this statutory ceiling.
2. The Cafeteria Plan Mandate
Unless an employer provides health care coverage under either
a bona fide collective bargaining agreement or through the Insur
ance Partnership Program, covered employers are also required to
establish cafeteria plans, within the meaning of § 125 of the Internal
Revenue Code, that offer at least one premium-only health benefit
option.68 While employers are free to contribute to these plans,
and may be required to contribute to them, under the fair and rea
sonable contribution requirement, the cafeteria plan requirement
simply requires the establishment of a premium-only cafeteria plan
with one or more medical care options.69
If the cafeteria plan requirement applies to an employer and
the employer fails to offer group health insurance to its employees
through a cafeteria plan, the employer will be subject to the imposi
tion of a surcharge, called the “free rider surcharge,” when certain
triggering events occur.70 These triggering events include the em
ployees of an employer who fails to comply with the cafeteria plan
requirement or the dependents of these employees incurring an ag
gregate of $50,000 in uncovered health care costs in a year and ei
ther (A) one employee or a dependent of an employee uses free
care more than three times in a year or (B) the aggregate of the
67. Id. § 188(c)(10); 114.5 MASS. CODE REGS. 16.04; see also Div. of Unemploy
ment Assistance, Executive Office of Labor & Workforce Dev., Important Notice of
Statutory and Regulatory Changes to the Fair Share Contribution Program (2009),
available at http://www.mass.gov/Elwd/docs/dua/business/FSC2009Instructions.pdf
(identifying the quarterly payments for 2009 at $73.75).
68. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151F, § 2; id. ch. 118G, § 1; 114.5 MASS. CODE REGS.
17.01 (2007). A cafeteria plan under § 125 of the Internal Revenue Code, which is also
referred to as a Section 125 Plan, is a plan established by an employer under which
employees can elect to receive certain benefits such as health insurance instead of cash
compensation and through such an arrangement the employees are able to purchase the
benefits offered through the plan with pre-tax dollars.
69. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151F, § 2; 114.5 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.01. Employers
that are required to establish cafeteria plans must file copies of the plan documents with
the Commonwealth Connector. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., Admin
istrative Information Bulletin 03-07 (2007), available at http://www.mass.gov/Elwd/docs/
dua/business/fscAdmInfoBulletin03.rtf.
70. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118G, § 18B(a). The free rider surcharge ranges from
10% to 100% of the cost incurred by the Commonwealth in providing care to the em
ployer’s employees and their dependents. Id. § 18B(b). This surcharge varies based on
the number of employees the employer employs and the level of state funded costs.
114.5 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.04.
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employer’s employees and their dependents use free care more
than five times in a year.71
3. Mandated Employer Reporting
In addition to the fair and reasonable premium contribution
requirement and the cafeteria plan requirement, covered employers
must also comply with three statutory reporting requirements.
The first reporting requirement obligates all covered employ
ers to complete and sign “employer health insurance responsibility
disclosure” forms on an annual basis.72 In completing these forms,
employers must provide information that the Division of Health
Care Finance and Policy will use to implement the free rider
surcharge.73
Employers of employees who decline employer sponsored cov
erage must also complete and cause their employees who decline
coverage to complete a second form called an “employee health
insurance responsibility disclosure” form.74 These forms, which
must be completed annually and retained by the employer for at
least three years, require the employer to indicate whether it has
offered to pay for employee health insurance and whether it has a
compliant cafeteria plan.75 The employee must then indicate on the
same form whether she has elected to receive health care coverage
and whether she has an alternative source of coverage.76
The third reporting requirement imposed on employers man
dates that employers who sponsor minimum creditable coverage
provide their employees with the 1099-HC forms that their employ
ees will need to complete their individual state income tax
returns.77
71. 114.5 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.04.
72. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118G, § 6C(a).
73. Id.; see Div. of Health Care Fin. & Policy, Executive Office of Health &
Human Servs., Employer Health Insurance Responsibility Disclosure 2008: FSC-Ex
empt Employers, available at http://www.mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/dhcfp/g/hcr/em
ployer_hird_fsc_exempt.pdf. This requires the employer to indicate if they have
adopted a compliant cafeteria plan. Id. An employer who either fails to file a health
insurance responsibility and disclosure form or who provides falsified information on a
filed form is subject to a fine of not less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 118G, § 6C(b).
74. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118G, § 6C(b).
75. Id.
76. Id.; see Div. of Health Care Fin. & Policy, Executive Office of Health &
Human Servs., Employee Health Insurance Responsibility Disclosure Form 2009, avail
able at http://www.mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/dhcfp/g/hcr/employee_hird_2009.pdf.
77. 830 MASS. CODE REGS. 111M2.1(8) (2008).
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In light of what is generally perceived as a national health care
crisis, it would seem that to the extent ERISA allows, it is
strongly in the public interest to permit states to perform their
traditional role of serving as laboratories for experiment in con
trolling the costs and increasing the quality of health care for all
citizens.78

Nonetheless, like the only pay-or-play law that has been imple
mented before it, the Bill is likely to face an ERISA preemption
challenge.79 While a court hearing this challenge is unlikely to hold
that the individual mandate, cafeteria plan requirement, and report
ing requirements are preempted, a court is likely to hold that the
fair share contribution requirement is preempted.80
The 1099-HC reporting requirements are imposed upon employers by the
Massachusetts Act. However, an employer insured under a contract with a
Massachusetts-licensed carrier, Blue Cross, Blue Shield or an HMO, shifts the
obligation to furnish the form 1099-HC to the carrier. Self-insured plans and
out-of-state employers insuring Massachusetts employees and their depen
dents under contracts written in other states must either provide the form di
rectly or contract with a third-party administrator or out of state carrier to
provide the form.
Peter Marathas, Robert Rachal & Yolanda Montgomery, Pay-or-Play State Health In
surance Laws and ERISA Preemption, 14 HR ADVISOR: LEGAL & PRACTICAL GUI
DANCE 3, 3-4 (2008), available at 14 No. 3 HR-ADV 3 (Westlaw).
78. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 496 n.15 (D. Md.
2006), aff’d, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007).
79. The Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act is not being included here because it
was granted a waiver from ERISA preemption by Congress after it was held preempted
in Standard Oil Co. of California v. Agsalud. 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d mem.,
454 U.S. 801 (1981); see 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(A) (2006) (exception for Hawaii Pre
paid Health Care Act). Interestingly, Governor Michael Dukakis initially contem
plated seeking such a waiver for the Massachusetts Health Security Act, but it was
determined that Congress would be unwilling to grant a waiver. Susan A. Goldberger,
The Politics of Universal Access: The Massachusetts Health Security Act of 1988, 15 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 857, 873 (1990).
80. The fair share contribution requirement is contained in a freestanding statute
that is distinct from the other statutory provisions established by the Bill. This will help
to insulate the remaining provisions from being preempted upon the preemption of the
Fair Share Contribution Requirement. In general, ERISA only preempts state laws
insofar as they relate to covered plans. Even when a part of a statute is preempted, the
remainder of a statute will be upheld so long as the preempted provision is severable
from the additional provisions of the statute. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 98
n.17 (1983); In re Laxson, 102 B.R. 85, 89 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989). Whether the provi
sion is severable from the remainder of the statute is a question of state law and the
intent of the state legislature. Id. A separability or severance clause in a statute is
given effect as an aid in determining the legislative intent, but a court can uphold the
remainder of an act irrespective of the existence of such a clause. Carter v. Carter Coal.
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A. The Individual Mandate Should Not Be Preempted
It is unlikely that the individual mandate established by the Bill
would be found to “relate to” ERISA plans and, thus, be pre
empted because the individual mandate has neither a “connection
with” nor a “reference to” ERISA plans.
The individual mandate requires residents of the Common
wealth, regardless of their employment status, to obtain health care
coverage that complies with the requirements established for “mini
mum creditable coverage.”81 The requirement that such coverage
be obtained is placed on individuals and not on their employers,
should they in fact be employed.82 As a state law that applies to a
wide variety of situations, including a large number of situations
that have no appreciable linkage to ERISA plans, the individual
mandate constitutes a law of general application83 in an area of
traditional state regulation, health care.84
Since the individual mandate is a law of general application in
an area of traditional state regulation, there is a rebuttable pre
sumption that Congress did not intend for ERISA to preempt it. It
is unlikely that a court would find this presumption rebutted and
hold that the individual mandate has a prohibited “reference to” or
“connection with” ERISA plans.
It is unlikely a court would hold that the individual mandate
has a prohibited “reference to” ERISA plans because it neither acts
immediately and exclusively on ERISA plans nor is the existence of
such plans essential to its operation.85 In contrast, the imposition of
the individual mandate is dependent solely on age and residency,
namely whether or not an individual is both a resident of the Com
monwealth and older than eighteen years of age. Since the factors
underlying the individual mandate are independent of both the exCo., 298 U.S. 238, 312 (1936); see, e.g., Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins.,
215 F.3d 526, 540 (5th Cir. 2000).
81. See supra section II.A.
82. 830 MASS. CODE REGS. 111M2.1(3) (2008).
83. Pharm. Care Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 304 (1st Cir. 2005) (providing that
“[a] state law that applies to a wide variety of situations, including an appreciable num
ber that have no specific linkage to ERISA plans, constitutes a law of general applica
tion” (alteration in original) (quoting Carpenters Local Union No. 26 v. U.S. Fid. &
Guar. Co., 215 F.3d 136, 144-45 (1st Cir. 2000))); see, e.g., De Buono v. NYSA-ILA
Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 815 (1997); Mackey v. Lanier Collection
Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 838 (1988).
84. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995).
85. See Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A.,
Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 335 (1997).
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istence of ERISA plans and the status of an individual under an
ERISA plan, the individual mandate cannot be said to have a “ref
erence to” such plans.86
The presumption that the individual mandate is not preempted
is also unlikely to be rebutted by a court holding that it has a pro
hibited “connection with” ERISA plans because the individual
mandate neither directly regulates nor effectively mandates some
element of the structure or administration of ERISA plans.87 At
most, the individual mandate creates an indirect economic incentive
that may affect, but does not bind, the choices of employers or their
plans.88
This indirect economic incentive for employers to provide cov
erage that complies with the individual mandate is created by the
greater value attributed to compliant coverage by employees and
the desire of employers, in turn, to provide an employee benefit to
which their employees attribute the greatest value.89 Employees at
tribute greater value to compliant coverage than noncompliant cov
erage because employees who receive noncompliant coverage must
incur the cost of purchasing additional coverage to satisfy the mini
mum creditable coverage requirement placed on them by the indi
vidual mandate. Importantly, this increased value of compliant
coverage, while sufficient to give employers an indirect incentive
for its provision, is insufficient to create a Hobson’s Choice for em
ployers, whereby employers are effectively required to provide
compliant coverage.90
86. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656.
87. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 192-93 (4th Cir. 2007).
88. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658; Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n, 475 F.3d at 192-93.
89. Employers have a desire to minimize their total labor costs by providing the
cash and benefit combination that their employees attribute the most value to. Sherry
Glied & Joshua Graff Zivin, Modeling Employer Decisions to Offer Health Insurance
12 (2004), available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/no7researchabstract.pdf. On
average, sixty percent of an employee’s compensation is composed of wages or salary
and the remaining forty percent is composed of benefits such as health insurance and
retirement benefits. MICHAEL B. SNYDER, BENEFITS GUIDE § 2.1 (2008).
90. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n, 475 F.3d at 192-93. The court in Retail Industry
Leaders Ass’n held that the Maryland Fair Share Act, MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL.
§§ 8.5-101 to -107 (LexisNexis 2008), which provided that an employer who employed
more than 10,000 employees in Maryland must either contribute eight percent of the
total wages it pays to Maryland employees toward employee health care costs or pay
the difference between its contribution and eight percent to the state, created a Hob
son’s Choice. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n, 475 F.3d at 193. This Hobson’s Choice effec
tively required covered employers to pay eight percent of their total payrolls to
covered plans because no rational employer would pay money to the state instead of
increasing an employee benefit. Id.
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Like the economic incentives upheld in both Travelers 91 and
Dillingham,92 the indirect economic incentive created by the indi
vidual mandate lacks a “connection with” or “reference to” covered
plans because it fails to bind plan administrators to any particular
choice, function as a regulation of an employer, or preclude uni
form administrative practice or the provision of a uniform benefit
package in different states.93
B. The Cafeteria Plan Requirement Should Not Be Preempted by
ERISA
Like the individual mandate, a court would likely conclude that
ERISA does not preempt the cafeteria plan requirement, which re
quires covered employers to establish premium-only cafeteria
plans.94 It is unlikely a court would hold the requirement pre
empted because an analysis of it shows that it lacks both a “connec
tion with” and a “reference to” covered plans.
The cafeteria plan requirement does not have a prohibited
“reference to” covered plans because it neither acts immediately
and exclusively on covered plans nor are they essential to its opera
tion. In contrast, the cafeteria plan requirement requires the provi
91. Travelers, 514 U.S. 645. In Travelers, the Court examined New York’s Pro
spective Hospital Reimbursement Methodology, which called for the cost of treatment
at a hospital to be based on the average cost of treating a condition rather than the
actual cost of treating it. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807(c) (McKinney Supp.
2010). The cost of treating the condition was based on its categorization under one of
the 794 Diagnostic Related Groups. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 649. Each Diagnostic Re
lated Group was then adjusted based on each particular hospital’s operating costs. Id.
at 649-50. Patients with Blue Cross & Blue Shield were billed at the appropriate rate
for the Diagnostic Related Group while other patients where surcharged up to twentyfour percent above this level. Id. at 650.
92. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc.,
519 U.S. 316, 316 (1997).
In Dillingham, the Supreme Court reviewed a California law that regulated
wages contractors paid to apprentices on public construction projects. The law
at issue allowed contractors to pay apprentices lower wages if they partici
pated in state certified apprentice programs. The Court found that by al
lowing contractors to pay lower wages, the law created an indirect incentive
for ERISA plans to obtain state certification. The Court determined that the
incentive to seek certification was not strong enough to eliminate the choice
regarding whether to seek certification. The Court found that the law was
similar to the New York Statute upheld in Travelers and determined that it
was not preempted by ERISA.
Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d 403, 413 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) (citations omitted).
93. See Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. at 326, 329; Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659-60.
94. See supra section II.B.
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sion of a noncovered benefit, namely a premium-only cafeteria plan
that offers a group health insurance option.
A premium-only cafeteria plan that offers a group health insur
ance option is not a covered plan because neither a cafeteria plan,
in and of itself, nor a premium-only group health insurance plan
constitutes a covered plan.95 A cafeteria plan, in and of itself, is not
an ERISA plan96 since it is a mere funding mechanism by which
employees can utilize pre-tax dollars to obtain certain benefits, and
the provision of tax advantaged treatment is not a benefit subject to
ERISA.97
Despite a cafeteria plan, in and of itself, failing to constitute a
covered plan, the mandate that employers establish cafeteria plans
under which employees can purchase group health insurance would
still be preempted by ERISA if the required benefit under the em
ployer mandated cafeteria plans is an ERISA plan.98 The critical
analysis, therefore, is whether the benefit required by the cafeteria
plan requirement, namely employee access to a premium-only
group health insurance plan, constitutes an ERISA plan.
An employer sponsored health insurance plan constitutes a
covered plan,99 but a health insurance plan that satisfies five condi
tions will be not be deemed to be employer sponsored and conse
quently will not be an ERISA-covered plan.100 These five
conditions are (1) the employer must not make any contributions to
the plan; (2) employee participation in the plan must be voluntary;
(3) the sole function of the employer with respect to the plan must
be either permitting the insurer to publicize the program or collect
ing premiums through payroll deductions; (4) the employer cannot
receive any consideration from the insurer other than reasonable
compensation for the administrative services the employer actually
renders in connection with payroll deductions; and (5) the employer
95. “Congress pre-empted state laws relating to plans [as defined in ERISA],
rather than simply to benefits.” Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11
(1987).
96. Dep’t of Labor Op. Ltr. 96-12A (July 17, 1996), available at http://www.dol.
gov/ebsa/programs/ori/advisory96/96-12a.htm.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See supra section I.A.
100. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j) (2009); see also Dep’t of Labor Op. Ltr. 96-12A (July
17, 1996), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/programs/ori/advisory96/96-12a.htm;
U.S. D.O.L. Field Assistance Bulletin 2004-1, available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/
fab_2004-1.html (discussing contributions to health care savings accounts) (last visited
Apr. 8, 2010).
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must not endorse the benefit.101 The cafeteria plan requirement
fails to require that an employer sponsor health insurance because
an employer can comply with the requirement without violating any
of these five conditions.
The fact that the cafeteria plan requirement fails to require the
provision of a covered benefit also results in it lacking a prohibited
connection with covered plans because employers and plan admin
istrators can satisfy the requirement without altering their covered
plans, and it does not otherwise interfere with the uniform nation
wide administration of employee benefit plans.102
C. The Reporting Requirements Should Not Be Preempted
Like the cafeteria plan requirement, the reporting require
ments imposed by the Bill on both employers and individuals would
not be preempted,103 but unlike the cafeteria plan requirement, the
reporting requirements have, at least in a technical sense, a “con
nection with” covered plans. Despite this connection, the reporting
requirements are not preempted because they do not interfere with
the uniform nationwide administration of employee benefit plans.
The reporting requirements in the Bill requiring employers to
report information regarding a covered benefit, group health insur
ance,104 lack a “reference to” ERISA plans because they function
irrespective of the existence of an ERISA plan,105 and a state law
has a “reference to” an ERISA plan only when it acts immediately
and exclusively on covered plans or when the existence of covered
plans is essential to its functioning.106 While an employer spon
101. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j); see also Dep’t of Labor Op. Ltr. 96-12A, supra note
100. An employer is deemed to have endorsed a benefit when the employer fails to
appear neutral to its employees in regard to their election to forgo receiving cash com
pensation in exchange for their purchase of a benefit available through the plan. An
employer is not deemed to have endorsed a plan by merely limiting the providers that it
allows to market products available through its cafeteria plan. Dep’t of Labor, Inter
pretive Bulletin Relating to Payroll Deduction IRAs, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.99-1 (2009).
102. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1987).
103. See supra section III.B. A health insurance plan that “involves a fund or
program maintained by an employer for the purpose of providing health benefits for
[an] employee ‘through the purchase of insurance or otherwise’” is an ERISA-covered
plan. District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 (1992)
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)).
104. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City & County of S.F., 535 F. Supp. 2d 968, 974
76 (N.D. Cal. 2007), rev’d, 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 1996).
105. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc.,
519 U.S. 316, 328 (1997).
106. Id. at 326.

R
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sored health insurance plan is an ERISA-covered plan, the Bill re
quires all covered employers to report information, irrespective of
whether they have an employer sponsored health insurance plan.
This statutory indifference towards the existence or inexistence of a
covered plan results in the reporting requirement lacking a “refer
ence to” covered plans.107
Despite lacking a “reference to” covered plans, a statute can
be preempted under ERISA if it fails the broader “connection
with” test. By requiring employers to report information to the
Commonwealth beyond the information that must be reported in
other states, the reporting requirements of the Bill place a burden
on the uniform nationwide administration of employee benefit
plans. Due to this resulting burden, the reporting requirements
have, at least technically, a “connection with” ERISA plans.108
In this technical sense, the Bill’s reporting requirements have a
“connection with” covered plans, but since the burden imposed on
covered plans is so slight, a court would likely determine that this
connection does not result in the reporting requirements being
deemed to “relate to” covered plans.109 Similar to the reporting
requirements upheld in Keystone Chapter, Associated Builders &
Contractors, Inc. v. Foley,110 the reporting requirements established
by the Bill require the reporting of only general and readily availa
ble payroll information.111 The reporting of such information has a
“connection with” covered plans, but the slight administrative bur
den arising from reporting such information does not burden or in
fluence the benefits or structure of employee benefit plans or
107. Id. at 328; see Keystone Chapter, Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v.
Foley, 37 F.3d 945, 956-57 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that a law does not contain a prohib
ited reference to covered plans if it is neither specifically designed to affect employee
benefits, singles out ERISA plans for special treatment, or creates a scheme in which
ERISA plans are so central that “the rights and restrictions [the law] creates are predi
cated on the existence of such a plan”); see also Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 546 F.3d at
657; WSB Elec., Inc. v. Curry, 88 F.3d 788, 792-93 (9th Cir. 1996).
108. See supra section I.B.
109. Burgio & Compofelice, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 107 F.3d 1000,
1008 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Keystone, 37 F.3d at 963; Felix A. Marino Co. v. Comm’r of
Labor & Indus., 689 N.E.2d 495, 498 (Mass. 1998).
110. Keystone, 37 F.3d at 958 (holding that reporting requirements established
under the Pennsylvania prevailing wage statute that allowed employers to use the value
of covered benefits to calculate the wages being paid fails to have a “reference to”
covered plans).
111. It may be posited that the burden of the Massachusetts statute is greater
than that in Egelhoff or in Keystone because the Bill requires administrators to first
determine if their plans meet the requirements of the individual mandate before send
ing employees 1099-HC forms. See id. at 962.
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otherwise interfere with the congressional goal of allowing the na
tionwide administration of uniform employee benefit plans, and, ac
cordingly, the reporting requirement is not preempted.112
D. The Fair Share Contribution Requirement Is Preempted
Whereas the individual mandate, the cafeteria plan require
ment, and the reporting requirements are all likely to survive an
ERISA preemption challenge, the requirement imposed on em
ployers to make a fair and reasonable contribution to their employ
ees’ coverage under an employer-established group health plan, as
such plan is defined in § 5000(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code,
is likely to be held preempted by ERISA under both the “reference
to” and “connection with” tests.
The fair share contribution requirement fails both prongs of
the “reference to” test.113 It has both an immediate and exclusive
impact on covered plans, and such plans are essential to its opera
tion. An immediate impact on covered plans exists when a state
statute requires employers to make contributions to ERISA
plans.114 Group health plans, as defined in § 5000(b)(1) of the In
ternal Revenue Code, to which employers make contributions, are
necessarily ERISA plans.115 By mandating that covered employers
make a specific contribution to a § 5000(b)(1) group health plan,
112. See id.; see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2d Cir.
1989) (“What triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administra
tive procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit
plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that
benefit.”); see also Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 158 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(citing De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 815 (1997),
and Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 482 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1988));
Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 546 F.3d at 657 (holding that the administrative burden cre
ated by requiring employers to calculate their health care expenditures for their em
ployees fails to have a prohibited connection with covered plans); WSB Elec., Inc., 88
F.3d at 796.
113. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 828; see Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997).
114. Gen. Elec. Co. v. N.Y. Dep’t of Labor, 891 F.2d 25, 30 (2d Cir. 1989); Local
Union 598, Plumbers & Pipefitters Indus. Journeyman & Apprentices Training Fund v.
J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 846 F.2d 1213, 1219 (9th Cir. 1988).
115. Madonia v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., 11 F.3d 444, 447 (4th Cir. 1993);
Brief for Chamber of Commerce of U.S.A. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee,
supra note 20, at 15. The overlap of the definitions of group health plans under the
Internal Revenue Code and employee welfare benefit plans under ERISA is readily
apparent. The former defines a group health plan as “a plan (including a self insured
plan) of, or contributed to by, an employer . . . or employee organization to provide
health care (directly or otherwise) to the employees, former employees, the employer,
others associated or formerly associated with the employer in a business relationship, or
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which is necessarily an ERISA plan, the fair share contribution re
quirement acts immediately and exclusively on covered plans.
The fair share contribution requirement also has a prohibited
“reference to” covered plans because covered plans are essential to
its operation. The fair share contribution requirement forces em
ployers to establish and contribute to group health plans within the
meaning of § 5000(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, which, as
indicated above, are necessarily ERISA plans. By requiring the es
tablishment of and contributions to covered plans, covered plans
are essential to the operation of the fair share contribution
requirement.116
Even if the fair share contribution requirement lacked a pro
hibited reference to covered plans, it would still be preempted for
having a “connection with” such plans because the nature of the
effect of the state statute is to interfere with the nationwide uniform
administration of employee benefit plans.117 This interference ex
ists because obligating employers to make specific contributions to
covered plans or to pay fees to the Commonwealth Care Trust Fund
forces plan sponsors to adjust their contributions to comply with the
levels of funding established by the fair share contribution require
ment.118 This required level of funding impairs the nationwide uni
form administration of employee benefit plans by preventing plan
administrators and employers from adopting uniform nationwide
funding schemes119 and gives rise to a prohibited connection with
such plans.120
their families.” 26 U.S.C. § 5000(b)(1) (2006). The latter defines “an employee welfare
benefit plan” as
any plan, fund, or program . . . established or maintained by an employer, or
by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or
program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its
participants or their beneficiaries through the purchase of insurance or other
wise, (A) medical surgical or hospital care benefits, or benefits in the event of
sickness, accident, disability . . . benefits.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
116. See Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 326; Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S.
133, 140 (1990); Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829; Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City & County of
S.F., 535 F. Supp. 2d 968, 974-76 (N.D. Cal. 2007), rev’d, 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 1996).
117. See supra section I.B.
118. See Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 976.
119. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n, 475 F.3d at 193-94.
120. “A [state] statute which mandates employer contributions to benefit plans
and which effectively dictates the level at which those . . . contributions must be made
has a most direct connection with an employee benefit plan.” Local Union 598, Plumb
ers & Pipefitters Indus. Journeyman & Apprentices Training Fund v. J.A. Jones Constr.
Co., 846 F.2d 1213, 1219 (9th Cir. 1988).
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It has been posited that the fair share contribution requirement
might not be preempted by ERISA because it only relates to ER
ISA plans at the election of employers.121 The premise of this posi
tion is that covered employers face only a $295 per employee fee
for noncompliance, which it is argued is substantially less than the
cost of making a fair share contribution. Based upon this premise,
the proponents of this position conclude that the fair share contri
bution requirement may be found to only constitute an economic
incentive that neither binds plan administrators to a particular
choice nor mandates the particular funding of a covered plan and is,
therefore, not preempted.122
While it is true that indirect economic incentives that merely
provide a financial benefit to a plan if the plan makes certain
choices lack a prohibited connection with covered plans,123 there
are three reasons why the fee imposed by the Bill for noncompli
ance is not the type of indirect economic incentive that falls within
this exception. First, the fee is not intended to constitute a financial
incentive but is rather a fee for noncompliance.124 Second, unlike
the options available in Golden Gate Restaurant Ass’n, where an
employer could comply with the contribution requirement by either
providing a covered benefit or a noncovered employee benefit,125
the fair share contribution requirement does not provide employers
with a set of alternatives. It mandates a specific action and charges
a fee for noncompliance that does not go to the direct benefit of the
employees126 but, instead, goes to the Commonwealth Care Trust
121. See, e.g., Stiefel, supra note 48, at 699-700.
122. See id.
123. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc.,
519 U.S. 316, 334 (1997); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 659-60 (1995); Keystone Chapter, Associated Builders
& Contractors, Inc. v. Foley, 37 F.3d 945, 960 (3rd Cir. 1994).
124. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(b) (2008); see Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n
v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 495 (D. Md. 2006), aff’d, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007);
see also Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 150-51 (2001).
125. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City & County of S.F., 546 F.3d 639, 660-61 (9th
Cir. 2007).
126. Id. at 655-56; see also Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664; Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n
v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 193 (4th Cir. 2007); J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 846 F.2d at 1218
(stating that a law relates to an ERISA plan if it directly or indirectly purports to regu
late employee benefit plans by attempting in one way or another to reach the terms or
conditions of such plans). In Retail Industry Leaders Ass’n, the court determined that
the two options provided by the statute resulted in a Hobson’s Choice because one
option was impractical. See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n, 475 F.3d at 197. Neither the
appellee nor the appellant argued, and the court did not discuss, the possibility that a
third option existed: breach the statute and pay a $250,000 fine. See id. at 193-97; see
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Fund.127 Third, unlike the financial incentives in Keystone,128 Trav
elers,129 and Dillingham,130 the fee is not contained in a law of gen
eral application that imposes an indirect burden on covered
plans.131 It is contained in a law that imposes a direct burden on
covered plans.132
E. Conclusion
ERISA preempts state laws insofar as they “relate to” ERISA
plans. This prohibited relationship exists if the state law has a “ref
erence to” or “connection with” covered plans. Under this test the
individual mandate, cafeteria plan requirement, and reporting re
quirements of the Bill will be upheld, while its fair share contribu
tion requirement will be preempted.
IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

TO THE

MASSACHUSETTS BILL

A. Introduction
Irrespective of how you look at it, the Bill is in trouble. Its cost
has far exceeded the cost predictions at the time of its passage,133
also MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-105(b) (LexisNexis 2008). For employers
with over 10,000 employees, Maryland’s $250,000 fine may be substantially less than the
Massachusetts contribution, a $295 annual per employee surcharge. In Massachusetts
no second option exists; an employer either complies with the law by making a fair and
reasonable premium contribution or pays the surcharge plus any applicable fines. See
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188.
127. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118G, § 18B(e).
128. See Keystone, 37 F.3d at 957-58 (upholding a state prevailing wage statute
that allowed contributions to ERISA plans to be taken into account when calculating
prevailing wage payments).
129. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656 (upholding a state statute imposing surcharges
on all patients covered by insurers and HMO plans other than Blue Cross and Blue
Shield).
130. See Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A.,
Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 328 (1997) (holding that California’s prevailing wage statute that
allowed employees who are enrolled in apprenticeship programs to be paid a lower
wage did not relate to covered plans despite some apprenticeship programs constituting
covered plans).
131. Laws of general application are state laws that apply to both covered plans
and situations that do not involve covered plans. These laws have been held to include
generally applicable state garnishment statutes, Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency &
Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 841 (1988), and statutes requiring companies to make lump
sum severance payments, Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 23 (1987).
132. Pharm. Care Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 304 (1st Cir. 2005).
133. When the Bill was passed the legislature predicted that $725 million would
be needed for Commonwealth Care subsidies in the third year, but it appears $869
million will be required. Trudy Lieberman, Cautionary Healthcare Tales from Califor
nia and Massachusetts, THE NATION, Mar. 25, 2008, http://www.thenation.com/doc/
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and one of its central requirements, the fair share contribution re
quirement, is subject to preemption. Preemption of the fair share
contribution requirement would, moreover, defeat the purposeful
interrelation between the individual mandate and fair share contri
bution requirement in the Bill.
The interrelation between the individual mandate and the em
ployer fair share contribution requirement effectively divides the
cost of mandated coverage between employees and employers. The
underlying purpose for this interrelation is the belief that while
health care coverage is an individual responsibility and necessity,
employers should be at least partially responsible for assisting em
ployees in procuring such coverage.134 Preemption of the employer
fair share contribution requirement will destroy its interrelation
with the individual mandate with the result that individuals will
bear the entire cost of the mandated coverage. The Common
wealth of Massachusetts cannot confidently expect to salvage the
Bill and its objective of dividing the cost of mandated coverage be
tween employers and employees unless an amendment or amend
ments implement certain changes to the Bill and the state minimum
wage.
There are four changes that are necessary to avoid a successful
ERISA preemption challenge while still accomplishing the objec
tive of having employers contribute to their employees’ mandated
coverage. First, an amendment should remove the employer fair
20080407/lieberman. There are three primary causes for this discrepancy. First, esti
mates at the time of the Bill’s passage placed the number of uninsureds in the Com
monwealth at 400,000 when in fact the number was closer to 650,000. Id. Second, it
was expected that reductions in the number of uninsureds would reduce the costs in
curred by the state’s free care pool by between $500 million $600 million. Id. These
savings have failed to materialize. Third, the cost of health care in Massachusetts has
continued to skyrocket at about ten percent per year. Id.; see also Alice Dembner,
Healthcare Cost Increases Dominate Mass. Budget Debate, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 26,
2008, at A12. The actual amount spent on free care was reduced by approximately
forty-one percent. Glen Johnson, State Insurance Law Result ‘Remarkable,’ WORCES
TER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Aug. 20, 2008, at A-3, available at http://www.
telegram.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080820/NEWS/808200370/1052. The pre
sent shortfall between the funds available for the Commonwealth Care subsidies and
the actual cost of subsidizing the policies has been resolved through placing an addi
tional one dollar per pack tax on cigarettes. This tax is expected to generate $174 mil
lion annually. Medical News Today, Massachusetts Cigarette Tax Increases by $1 Per
Pack to Fund State Health Insurance Law, July 4, 2008, http://www.medicalnewstoday.
com/articles/113934.php.
134. See State House News Service, Daily Transcript, May 4, 2006 (on file with
Western New England Law Review) (Senator Lees’s response to question regarding
overriding Governor Mitt Romney’s veto of section 47 of House Bill 4779).
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share contribution requirement because it has generated a meager
$6 million135 and, more importantly, is preempted by ERISA.136
Second, an amendment to the state minimum wage should both in
crease and bifurcate the minimum wage into a cash portion and a
benefit portion, similar to a prevailing wage. Third, an amendment
to the Bill should implement further restrictions on employee ac
cess to plans under the Commonwealth Care Program. Fourth, an
amendment strengthening the individual mandate should be passed.
B. Removal of the Fair Share Contribution Requirement and
Restructuring of Minimum Wage
Despite ERISA preempting state efforts to force employers to
contribute to their employees’ health care coverage, the goal of the
fair share contribution requirement, to have employers contribute
to their employees’ coverage, can still be accomplished through a
more indirect means. This indirect means would involve increasing
the minimum wage by the amount that it is believed employers
should contribute to their employees’ coverage and structuring the
minimum wage to resemble a prevailing wage by dividing it into
cash and benefit portions.137 This proposed minimum wage would
resemble the existing New York prevailing wage138 in that employ
ers could not satisfy the benefit portion by paying its cash
equivalent. As a result, all employees, irrespective of their cash
compensation, would receive a threshold level of benefits. To sur
vive preemption, employers must be able to satisfy the benefit por
tion of the wage by providing, at their election, either ERISAcovered benefits, such as employer sponsored health care coverage,
or benefits that fall beyond the scope of ERISA.139
This option to provide a benefit other than a contribution to
wards an employee’s health care coverage is necessary for the re
vised minimum wage to survive preemption140 but could lead to the
failure of the statute to accomplish its goal of having employers
share in the cost of their employees’ health care coverage. To re
135. Dembner, supra note 133.
136. See supra section III.D.
137. This could also help to address the discrepancy between the cost of providing
care to uninsureds and the maximum employer fee of $295 per employee for covered
employers who fail to make a fair and reasonable premium contribution to their em
ployees’ coverage.
138. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 220 (McKinney 2009).
139. Burgio & Campofelice, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 107 F.3d 1000,
1009 (2d Cir. 1997).
140. Id.
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duce the risk of failure, employers must be persuaded to satisfy the
benefit portion of the wage with contributions towards their em
ployees’ health care coverage, instead of providing an alternative
noncash benefit. This persuasion could be created by placing incen
tives on employees to favor a contribution towards their health care
coverage over an alternative noncash benefit because if the cost to
an employer is the same, a rational employer will elect to provide
the benefit to which its employees attribute the greatest value.141
The existing individual mandate creates an incentive for em
ployees to favor a contribution towards coverage over a different
noncash benefit because a contribution towards coverage would re
duce an employee’s premium, leaving more cash in the employee’s
pocket, and, in general, employees favor additional cash compensa
tion over additional noncash benefits.142 This preference for in
creased cash compensation over increased benefits provides a
canvas upon which the Commonwealth can design additional incen
tives for employees to favor premium contributions over alternative
noncash benefits.
One such additional incentive could be to limit employee ac
cess to Commonwealth Care Plans to employees who fund their
premium contributions with payroll deductions. By limiting em
ployee access to these subsidized plans to employees who fund their
contributions with payroll deductions, employees who qualify for
the plans will elect to pay for their coverage with payroll deductions
rather than purchasing nonsubsidized plans. The payroll deduc
tions will then reduce the employee’s weekly take-home pay by the
amount of the pay period’s subsidized premium. In order to allevi
ate this deduction and increase the employee’s take home pay,
which in general an employee would prefer over receiving an addi
tional noncash benefit, the employee would pressure his employer
to contribute towards his premium instead of providing an alternate
noncash benefit.143
141. See supra note 90.
142. See Promoting Retirement Plan Coverage Among Small Employers: Hearing
on Pension Issues Before the Ways and Means Subcomm. on Oversight, 105th Cong.
(1998) (testimony of Paul J. Yakobowski, Senior Research Associate, Employee Benefit
Research Institute), available at http://www.ebri.org/publications/testimony/index.cfm?
fa=t110.
143. In essence, employees who receive the contribution towards their coverage
would receive a contribution by their employer towards coverage and a subsidy from
the Commonwealth for this coverage, thereby increasing the cash plus health insurance
value of their paycheck.
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To prevent an individual from failing to procure coverage and
at the same time receiving an additional noncash benefit that the
individual deems to be more valuable than minimum creditable
coverage, the individual mandate should be amended. This amend
ment would provide that if an employee fails to procure minimum
creditable coverage, a withholding will be taken from the em
ployee’s paycheck in the amount of the premium for the least ex
pensive plan offered by the Commonwealth Connector. These
amounts would then be turned over to the Commonwealth Connec
tor and would be used to purchase the least expensive unsubsidized
policy that is available for the employee. This would result in the
employee having to pay the equivalent of an unsubsidized premium
when he might otherwise qualify for a subsidized one, and he would
not be receiving employer contributions toward this premium, with
the resulting effect that his weekly take-home pay would be re
duced. Again, to alleviate this reduction in take-home pay, the em
ployee would seek to have his employer contribute to his coverage
instead of providing the additional noncash benefit.
C. Proposed Amendments and ERISA Preemption
The proposed amendments to the state minimum wage and the
individual mandate would not only rectify the current deficiencies
of the Bill but would also likely survive an ERISA preemption
challenge.
1. The Proposed Amendments to the Minimum Wage
Would Not Be Preempted
In analyzing the restructured minimum wage, which includes a
cash portion and a benefit portion, a court would begin with the
presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt the state law
because the regulation of wages is a traditional area of state regula
tion.144 With this presumption in mind, a court would then apply
the “reference to” and “connection with” tests.
The ability of an employer to satisfy the benefit portion of the
wage with either covered or noncovered benefits results in the re
structured wage lacking a “reference to” covered plans because
144. Keystone Chapter, Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Foley, 37 F.3d
945, 959 (3d Cir. 1994).
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they are neither essential to its operation nor does the restructured
wage act immediately and exclusively on them.145
In addition to preventing the restructured minimum wage from
containing a prohibited “reference to” covered plans, the election
available to employers in satisfying the benefit portion of the wage
also prevents the statute from having a prohibited “connection
with” covered plans. There is no prohibited “connection with” cov
ered plans because employers and plan administrators have discre
tion either to leave their plans intact and provide a noncovered
benefit or alter their plans and provide a covered benefit. This
choice insulates the statute from interfering with the uniform na
tionwide administration of employee benefit plans.146 This result is
unaffected by the burden created by requiring employers to calcu
late the per-hour value of the benefit being provided, which may be
a covered benefit because the burden the calculation creates is ex
tremely slight.147
2. The Proposed Amendments to the Individual Mandate
Should Not Be Preempted
In analyzing the enhanced individual mandate, a court would
likely break its analysis into two parts. The first part would ex
amine the mandates placed on individuals and the second would
examine the mandates placed on employers. Both parts of this
analysis would begin with the presumption that Congress did not
intend to preempt the state statute because the enhanced individual
mandate is a generally applicable law in traditional areas of state
145. Felix A. Marino Co. v. Comm’r of Labor & Indus., 689 N.E.2d 495, 498
(Mass. 1998); see also Burgio & Campofelice, Inc., 107 F.3d at 1008-09; Keystone, 37
F.3d at 960-62 (citing Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983)); Gen. Elec.
Co. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 891 F.2d 25, 29-30 (2d Cir. 1989); Local Union 598,
Plumbers & Pipefitters Indus. Journeyman & Apprentices Training Fund v. J.A. Jones
Constr. Co., 846 F.2d 1213, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 1988). The choice created by the enhanced
individual mandate would be preempted if it created a Hobson’s Choice, which is no
choice at all, but, unlike covered employers in Retail Industry Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder,
which were required to provide the covered benefit or pay its cash equivalent to the
State, employers in Massachusetts would have a real option of providing either a cov
ered benefit or a noncovered benefit. There would just be an employee preference for
the benefit to be a covered benefit, a contribution to employer sponsored health insur
ance. See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 202 (4th Cir. 2007).
146. Burgio & Campofelice, Inc., 107 F.3d at 1009.
147. Id. at 1007; Minn. Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v.
Minn. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 47 F.3d 975, 979-80 (8th Cir. 1995); Keystone, 37 F.3d at
962; see also Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City & County of S.F., 546 F.3d 639, 645 (9th
Cir. 2008).
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regulation, healthcare and wages,148 but after this common starting
point, the two parts of the analysis would diverge.
In analyzing the requirements placed on individuals, a court
would apply the “reference to” and “connection with” tests and
hold that the requirements survive preemption for essentially the
same reasons the existing individual mandate would.149 The new
requirements lack a “reference to” covered plans because the obli
gation is placed on individuals irrespective of their status under ER
ISA plans,150 and, consequently, the requirements do not act
immediately and exclusively on covered plans nor is the existence
of such plans essential to their operation.
The requirements placed on individuals by the enhanced indi
vidual mandate also do not have a prohibited connection with cov
ered plans. A prohibited connection with covered plans exists if the
state statute mandates an element of the structure or administration
of ERISA plans or otherwise interferes with the uniform nation
wide administration of such plans.151 At most, the new require
ments imposed on individuals have an indirect effect on covered
plans by establishing a financial incentive for employers to provide
a covered benefit. This indirect economic incentive neither binds
plan administrators to a particular choice nor interferes with the
uniform nationwide administration of employee benefit plans.
Thus, the connection between the mandates imposed on individuals
by the enhanced individual mandate and covered plans is insuffi
cient to result in preemption under the “connection with” test.152
After finding that the requirements placed on individuals by
the enhanced individual mandate survive preemption, a court
would analyze the provisions of the enhanced individual mandate
requiring employers to take withholdings from the paychecks of
employees who fail to procure coverage. The court conducting this
inquiry would find the employer mandates also lack a prohibited
“reference to” or “connection with” covered plans.
A challenge to the withholding requirement under the “refer
ence to” test would most likely be premised on an argument that
148. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371
(1976).
149. See supra section III.A.
150. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 537 U.S. 141, 147 (2001); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards
Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997).
151. See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983).
152. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659-62.
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covered plans are essential to the requirement’s operation because
the requirement forces employers either to establish or contribute
to covered plans. The fundamental flaw with this argument is that
the employer withholdings, which are turned over to the Common
wealth Connector and used by it to purchase private insurance, fail
to give rise to a “plan,” as that term is used in ERISA. Conse
quently, there is no requirement that employers establish or con
tribute to covered plans.
The withholding requirement fails to give rise to a plan be
cause to create a plan, as defined in ERISA, there must be the crea
tion of either an employee pension benefit plan or an employee
welfare benefit plan.153 Since the withholding requirement clearly
does not create an employee pension benefit plan, a litigant would
premise the challenge on the existence of an employee welfare ben
efit plan. An employee welfare benefit plan exists when there is a
“plan, fund, or program . . . established or maintained by an em
ployer . . . through the purchase of insurance or otherwise . . . [that
provides] medical, surgical, or hospital [benefits].”154
The first requirement for an employee welfare benefit plan is
not satisfied by the mandated withholdings because there is no
plan, fund, or program. A plan, as that term is used in the defini
tion of an employee welfare benefit plan, “comprises a set of rules
that define the rights of a beneficiary and provide for their enforce
ment. Rules governing the collection of premiums, definition of
benefits, submission of claims, and resolution of disagreements over
entitlement to services are the sorts of provisions that constitute a
plan.”155 A plan, fund, or program does not exist when, as with the
withholding requirement, an employer pays amounts out of its gen
eral assets on a regular basis and the employer’s corresponding ad
ministrative duties in calculating and paying such amounts are so
ministerial that the abuses Congress was concerned with when it
passed ERISA are absent.156
The ministerial nature of the duties created by the withholding
requirement is evidenced by the requirement imposing no greater
153. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2006).
154. Id. § 1002(1); Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City & County of S.F., 546 F.3d
639, 653 (9th Cir. 2008); Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Ahue, 12 F.3d 1498, 1501-02 (9th Cir.
1993).
155. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 222-23 (2000); see also Massachusetts v.
Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115-16 (1989) (holding that vacation benefits package that an
employer pays out of its general assets, like wages, rather than out of a separate fund,
fails to constitute a plan).
156. See Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 546 F.3d at 650-53.
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burden on employers than the burden imposed by the multitude of
other required withholdings in existence, such as state and federal
income and employment tax withholdings.
Even if a plan is found to exist, this plan would not be an em
ployee welfare benefit plan. The second requirement for an em
ployee welfare benefit plan is that the plan provide “medical,
surgical, or hospital [benefits]” to its participants “through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise.”157 This requirement would
not be met because employers are not providing a benefit through
the purchase of insurance or otherwise. Instead, they are making
mandated contributions to a state entity that the state entity uses to
purchase private insurance. The position that employers are not
providing the benefit through the purchase of insurance or other
wise is evidenced by the fact that both the Commonwealth Connec
tor and the policies offered by the private insurers through the
Connector would exist irrespective of whether employers make
payments to the Connector because employees would be required
to purchase the coverage.158
Despite the withholding requirement lacking a “reference to”
covered plans, it could still be preempted under the broader “con
nection with” test, which examines whether or not the challenged
statute interferes with the uniform nationwide administration of
employee benefit plans. In contrast to statutes that bind plan ad
ministrators to particular choices159 or force covered plans to pro
vide certain benefits,160 the withholding requirement fails to force
employers to alter their existing plans either directly or by creating
a Hobson’s Choice, and it thus fails to contain a prohibited “con
nection with” covered plans.161
CONCLUSION
One of the most serious problems facing the nation is decreas
ing access to health care. This decreasing access is caused by a mul
titude of factors including the spiraling cost of care, the increasing
cost of insurance, and a reduction in employer sponsored coverage.
Historically, political forces have prevented the implementation of
157. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3).
158. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 546 F.3d at 653.
159. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001).
160. See Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695, 696 (N.D. Cal.
1977), aff’d, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981).
161. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 659-60 (1995); Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 546 F.3d at 656.
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the fundamental changes at the federal level that must be made, but
states have not ignored the cries of their residents and have at
tempted to enact measures to increase access to care. The Massa
chusetts Bill is one of these measures, and it attempts to address a
problem that has led to a reduction in access to care—the decrease
in employer sponsored coverage.
While the Massachusetts Bill has advanced the process towards
creating a solution to the health care crisis, like many initial legisla
tive efforts towards socioeconomic reform, it is flawed. Besides
costs exceeding expectations, one of its key elements, the fair share
contribution requirement, is subject to being preempted by ERISA,
a federal statute that was ironically intended to further the provi
sion of employee benefits. “Still . . . the unraveling of [the Bill] will
not signal the end to the story of universal health in Massachusetts.
The same pressures that created the conditions for passage of the
current law will continue to exert their effect until a more durable
solution is found.”162 As the pressures for a more durable solution
continue to grow, examination of the strengths and weaknesses of
the Bill and of proposed legislative redress are the necessary build
ing blocks towards devising a durable solution.

162. Goldberger, supra note 79, at 859 (discussing the Massachusetts Health Security Act of 1988, which was intended to establish universal coverage for residents of
the Commonwealth but was repealed under economic circumstances that mirror those
the Commonwealth currently faces).
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